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作者：Ozdogan, Ayca
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player. This class, namely reputation games with one-sided moral hazard, can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden-information or hidden-action. Extending the techniques of Cripps et al. (2004), it is found that neither player can sustain a rep...
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作者：Brunner, Christoph; Hu, Audrey; Oechssler, Joerg
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and conduct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions. In our experiment, subjects are sorted into risk-averse and risk-loving groups. We find that revenues in the EPA are significantly higher when bidders are ris...
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作者：Seel, Christian
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions of the head start. The stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. I iden...
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作者：Stovall, John E.
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
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作者：Kovac, Eugen; Schmidt, Robert C.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies. Market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion. Depending on the parameters, we obtain different 'classes' of dynamics. When firms ar...
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作者：Feige, Uriel; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider the problem of dividing a homogeneous divisible good among n players. Each player holds a private non-negative utility function that depends only on the amount of the good that he receives. We define the fair share of a player P to be the average utility that a player could receive if all players had the same utility function as P. We present a randomized allocation mechanism in which every player has a dominant strategy for maximizing his expected utility. Every player that follow...
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作者：Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Zizzo, Daniel John
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether subjects adapt beliefs when gaining experience, and if so whether they take the QRE or the level-k learning path. We estimate transitions between level-k and QRE belief rules using Markov-switching rule ...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Users need to connect a pair of target nodes in the network. They share the fixed connection costs of the edge. The system manager elicits target pairs from users, builds the cheapest forest meeting all demands, and choose a cost sharing rule satisfying: Routing-proofness: a user cannot lower his cost by reporting as several users along an alternative path connecting his target nodes; Stand Alone core stability: no group of users pay more than the cost of a subnetwork meeting all connection ne...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En
作者单位：Duke University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement noise, where the senders observe the true state with high probability, we show this under mild assumptions, for both unbounded and large bounded state spaces. In the case of continuous noise, where senders...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Encaoua, David; Lefouili, Yassine
作者单位：University of Iowa; Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity is uncertain. We provide sufficient conditions of a general nature under which the licensor prefers to use a per-unit royalty contract. In particular we show that this is the case for the holders of weak patents if the strategic effect of an increase in a potential licensee's unit cost on the equilibrium industry profit is positive. The latter condition is shown to hold in a Coumot (resp. Bertr...
