Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Goethe University Frankfurt; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 289-305
• 关键词: delegation; Real authority; strategic ignorance

摘要

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.