Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 132-136
• 关键词: Limit ESS; evolutionary stability; extensive-form games

摘要

A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that mutants are arbitrarily rare relative to trembling incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.