Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.015
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 109-126
• 关键词: Preference aggregation; strategy-proofness; Population monotonicity

摘要

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet-Kemeny aggregation method. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.