On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans
• 署名单位: University of Granada; Columbia University; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 40-57
• 关键词: CONFLICT; rent-seeking; appropriation; PEACE; escalation; tournaments; contests

摘要

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.