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作者：Archer, Aaron; Kleinberg, Robert
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Cornell University
摘要：We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those satisfying two properties: local weak monotonicity and vortex-freeness. The first of these constrains the function values at any two sufficiently proximal points, while the second asserts that its line integral...
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作者：Andersson, Ola; Argenton, Cedric; Weibull, Jorgen W.
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Stockholm School of Economics; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions ar...
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作者：Ewerhart, Christian
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Biconcavity is a simple condition on inverse demand that corresponds to the ordinary concept of concavity after simultaneous parameterized transformations of price and quantity. The notion is employed here in the framework of the homogeneous-good Cournot model with potentially heterogeneous firms. The analysis leads to unified conditions, respectively, for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium via nonincreasing best-response selections, for existence via quasiconcavity, and for the uniq...
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作者：Klabjan, Diego; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wolinsky, Asher
摘要：A decision maker (DM) considers the acquisition of a multi-attribute object with uncertain qualities which can be discovered at a cost DM's problem is to decide how much to invest in the discovery and whether to adopt or discard based on partial information. We characterize the solution in some special cases and discuss the computability of the solution in more general cases. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, Theodore L.
作者单位：University of East Anglia; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI); Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC); University of East Anglia; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts, which we term 'overspreading.' We investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally, and of convex versus linear costs of effort, while holding fixed the Na...
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作者：Di Tillio, Alfredo; Halpern, Joseph Y.; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Cornell University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study type spaces where a player's type at a state is a conditional probability on the space. We axiomatize these spaces using conditional belief operators, examining three additional axioms of increasing strength. First, introspection, which requires the agent to be unconditionally certain of her beliefs. Second, echo, according to which the unconditional beliefs implied by the condition must be held given the condition. Third, determination, which says that the conditional beliefs are the...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：We study a standard model of exchange economies with individual endowments. It is well known that no rule is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof. In order to quantify the extent of this impossibility, we parametrize axioms on allocation rules. Given an axiom A, a parametrization of A is a continuum of axioms {delta-A}(delta is an element of[0,1]) such that (i) delta-A is equivalent to A if and only if delta = 1; (ii) delta-A is vacuous if and only if delta = 0; and (iii) for e...
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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Yale University; National University of Singapore; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Homer et al. (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, it is shown that this limit set of payoffs is a convex polytope when attention is restricted to perfect public equili...
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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作者：Feldman, Michal; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of British Columbia
