Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Trudeau, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Windsor
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.010
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 137-151
• 关键词: Minimum cost spanning tree; Steiner tree; cost sharing; Weighted Shapley value

摘要

We consider an extension of minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems in which some agents do not need to be connected to the source, but might reduce the cost of others to do so. Even if the cost usually cannot be computed in polynomial time, we extend the characterization of the Kar solution (Kar, 2002) for classic mcst problems. It is obtained by adapting the Equal treatment property: if the cost of the edge between two agents changes, their cost shares are affected in the same manner if they have the same demand. If not, their changes are proportional to each other. We obtain a family of weighted Shapley values. Three interesting solutions in that family are characterized using stability, fairness and manipulation-proofness properties. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.