Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ozdogan, Ayca
• 署名单位: TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 211-220
• 关键词: Reputation; two-sided incomplete information; moral hazard

摘要

This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player. This class, namely reputation games with one-sided moral hazard, can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden-information or hidden-action. Extending the techniques of Cripps et al. (2004), it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games; and, the reputations disappear uniformly across all Nash equilibria. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.