Asymmetric parametric division rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stovall, John E.
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 87-110
• 关键词: Claims; bankruptcy; rationing; Fair allocation; Consistency; Intrapersonal consistency

摘要

We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.