The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Seel, Christian
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 330-338
• 关键词: all-pay contests; Head start; asymmetric information

摘要

This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions of the head start. The stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. I identify why my results for an uncertain head start differ qualitatively from uncertainty about a cost function or a valuation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.