Decentralized matching and social segregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yan; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Morgan, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Zurich; University of Konstanz; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 17-43
• 关键词: Decentralized matching; segregation; experiment

摘要

Social segregation is a ubiquitous feature of human life. People segregate along the lines of income, religion, ethnicity, language, and other characteristics. This study provides the first experimental examination of decentralized matching with search frictions and institutionalized segregation. The findings indicate that, without a segregation institution, high types over-segregate relative to the equilibrium prediction. We observe segregation attempts even when equilibrium suggests that everyone should accept everyone else. In the presence of a segregation institution, we find that, while the symmetric segregation institution increases matching success rate and efficiency in one environment, it has weak or no effect in a steep-incentive environment. By adding an entry cost to a flat-incentive market however, the asymmetric segregation institution leads to an increased matching success rate and efficiency in both environments, which underscores the importance of a coordination device. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.