A passion for voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Panova, Elena
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 44-65
• 关键词: expressive voting; Self-signaling; Ignorant voting; Habitual voting; Bandwagon and underdog effects; Information aggregation in elections; status quo bias

摘要

We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.