Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Polonio, Luca; Di Guida, Sibilla; Coricelli, Giorgio
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Trento; University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 80-96
• 关键词: Game theory; Strategic sophistication; social preferences; attention; eye-tracking

摘要

We used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in two-player normal-form games. Participants played one-shot games in which either, neither, or only one of the players had a dominant strategy. First, we performed a mixture models cluster analysis to group participants into types according to the pattern of visual information acquisition observed in a single class of games. Then, we predicted agents' choices in different classes of games and observed that patterns of visual information acquisition were game invariant. Our method allowed us to predict whether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not, and to attribute out-of-equilibrium responses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest the existence of individually heterogeneous-but-stable patterns of visual information acquisition based on subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licensesiby-nc-nd/4.0/).