Markets, correlation, and regret-matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 42-58
• 关键词: Exchange economies; Walrasian equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Sunspot equilibrium; DYNAMICS; regret-matching; Socially concave games; Deterministic regret-matching dynamics; Hannan set; Implementation of Walrasian equilibria

摘要

Inspired by the existing work on correlated equilibria and regret-based dynamics in games, we carry out a first exploration of the links between equilibria and dynamics in (exchange) economies. The leading equilibrium concept is Walrasian equilibrium, and the dynamics (specifically, regret-matching dynamics) apply to trading games that fit the economic structure and whose pure Nash equilibria implement the Walrasian outcomes. Interestingly, in the case of quasilinear utilities (or transferable utility), all the concepts essentially coincide, and we get simple deterministic dynamics converging to Walrasian outcomes. Connections to sunspot equilibria are also studied. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.