Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Lopez-Vargas, Kristian; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-16
• 关键词: Multi-object auctions; Vickrey; Second-price; package; resale

摘要

We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single- or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility. Our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case. However, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment. Preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.