Strategic disclosure of feasible options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
• 署名单位: Brown University; Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.016
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 145-165
• 关键词: Bargaining; disclosure

摘要

The paper illustrates how people who need to make a joint decision may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of Pareto improving options. The resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options. Various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally, and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified. Qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure. Enforcing a hard deadline for disclosure may be welfare improving in some circumstances. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.