Pessimistic information gathering

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 75-96
• 关键词: Information gathering; moral hazard; asymmetric information; pessimism

摘要

An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following good news with a fixed low-powered option otherwise. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.