An equilibrium characterization of an all-pay auction with certain and uncertain prizes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Riis, Christian
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 431-436
• 关键词: All pay auctions; Uncertain prizes

摘要

In the important contribution All pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes published in Minchuk and Sela (2014), the authors analyze an all pay auction with multiple prizes. The specific feature of the model is that all valuations are common except for the valuation of one of the prizes, for which contestants have private valuations. However, the equilibrium characterization derived in the paper is incorrect. This paper provides the correct equilibrium characterization of the model. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.