Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations - an experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian
• 署名单位: Justus Liebig University Giessen; University of Hamburg; University of Hamburg; Justus Liebig University Giessen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 32-43
• 关键词: conditional cooperation; Endogenous evaluations; indirect reciprocity; Noisy reputation; Second-order beliefs

摘要

We investigate a repeated public good game with group size two and stranger matching. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period, participants receive information regarding the evaluation of the previous period. Evaluations are subjective judgments, hence our reputation system allows for some degree of noise. There are two information treatments: Each participant receives information either about her partner's evaluation, or about her own and her partner's evaluation. The results show that although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluations, we find an increase in contributions. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.