Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dogan, Battal
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.010
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 165-171
• 关键词: No-envy; Nash-implementation; Divide-and-Transpose

摘要

We show that a simple game form, which resembles the Divide-and-Choose procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution on domains of economies where the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (an allocation obtained from a feasible allocation by interchanging the bundles of any two agents is also feasible) and preferences are complete (each agent can compare any two bundles). Our result extends a result by Thomson (2005) and it is applicable to a wide class of models including the classical model of fair allocation, the unidimensional single-peaked model, cake division model, and allocation of indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that, even when the preferences exhibit consumption externalities, an extension of the no-envy solution is Nash-implementable on general domains of economies. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.