Welfare maximization entices participation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Hofbauer, Johannes
• 署名单位: Technical University of Munich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.008
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 308-314
• 关键词: SSB utility; No show paradox; maximal lotteries; stochastic dominance

摘要

We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to Moulin's well-known no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988), which shows that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.