Fair share and social efficiency: A mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dong, Lu; Falvey, Rod; Luckraz, Shravan
• 署名单位: Nanjing Audit University; Bond University; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.016
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 209-224
• 关键词: Experimental economics; fairness; mechanism design

摘要

We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final distribution is determined by these assignments. We show that efficiency can be achieved under this simple mechanism and, in a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that players reward others based on relative contributions in most cases and that the players' contributions improve substantially and almost immediately with 80 percent of players contributing fully. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.