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作者：Battigalli, P.; Catonini, E.; Lanzani, G.; Marinacci, M.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a game in extensive form recurrently played by agents who are randomly drawn from large populations and matched. We assume that preferences over actions at any information set admit a smooth-ambiguity representation in the sense of Klibanoff et al. (2005), which may induce dynamic inconsistencies. We take this into account in our analysis of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) given players' feedback about the path of play. Battigalli et al. (2015) show that the set of SCE's of a sim...
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作者：Dickinson, David L.; McElroy, Todd
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; State University System of Florida; Florida Gulf Coast University
摘要：This paper examines how a commonly experienced cognitive state, sleepiness, impacts choice in a Bayesian task. We implement an ecologically valid sleep manipulation, and our main result is the increased use of a simple reinforcement-heuristic when sleepy. While use of this heuristic leads to errors in difficult decision environments where Bayes rule and reinforcement conflict, it does not harm choice accuracy in easier environments where Bayes rule and reinforcement coincide. Our results overa...
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作者：Tierney, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark
摘要：There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location, and thereby cause a congestion effect that is modeled in a general way. We assign harvesting rights based on preferences alone, though we later extend the model to accommodate private endowments of money. We find the best allocation rule in the class of rules that are stra...
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作者：Alon, Shiri; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：The paper introduces an axiomatic characterization of a solution to bargaining problems. Bargaining problems are specified by: (a) the preference relations of the bargaining parties (b) resources that are the subject of bargaining, and (c) a pre-specified disagreement bundle for each party that would result if bargaining fails. The approach is ordinal in that parties' preferences are over bundles of goods and do not imply any risk attitudes. The resulting solution is accordingly independent of...
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作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Gottlieb, Daniel
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) proposed a model of a competitive market with adverse selection and showed that a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium may not exist. Among the solutions proposed to deal with this problem, a particularly influential one is the notion of Riley (or reactive) equilibrium (Riley, 1979). We give an example that shows that a Riley equilibrium may not exist if consumers are not ordered. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mueller, Stephan; Rau, Holger A.
作者单位：University of Gottingen
摘要：This paper theoretically and experimentally studies decision-making in risky and social environments. We explore the interdependence of two decisive behavioral determinants in such environments: risk attitudes and social preferences in the form of inequality aversion. Our model and the data demonstrate that individual risk aversion is attenuated when lagging behind peers, whereas it is amplified under favorable income inequality. Moreover, people's choices are not only context-dependent, but t...
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作者：Nax, Heinrich H.; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper investigates the role that risk attitudes play in the evolution of conventions in the long run. Risk aversion is shown to be associated with the evolution of maximin conventions, and risk seeking with the evolution of payoff dominant conventions. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents' payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game. (C) 2019 Els...
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作者：Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); Universidade de Lisboa; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
摘要：In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often...
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作者：Alaei, Saeed; Hardine, Jason; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang
作者单位：Cornell University; Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We consider the more demanding problem of approximating the revenue of the ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an anonymous price and derive a formula for their worst-case ratio, d...
