Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battigalli, P.; Catonini, E.; Lanzani, G.; Marinacci, M.
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-29
• 关键词: Sequential games with feedback; Smooth ambiguity; self-confirming equilibrium

摘要

We consider a game in extensive form recurrently played by agents who are randomly drawn from large populations and matched. We assume that preferences over actions at any information set admit a smooth-ambiguity representation in the sense of Klibanoff et al. (2005), which may induce dynamic inconsistencies. We take this into account in our analysis of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) given players' feedback about the path of play. Battigalli et al. (2015) show that the set of SCE's of a simultaneous-move game with feedback expands as ambiguity aversion increases. We show by example that SCE in a sequential game is not equivalent to SCE applied to the strategic form of such game, and that the previous monotonicity result does not extend to general sequential games. Still, we provide sufficient conditions under which the monotonicity result holds for SCE. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.