Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Perez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 177-192
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; competitive equilibrium; comparative statics

摘要

The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents' payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.