The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tierney, Ryan
• 署名单位: University of Southern Denmark
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: Incentive-compatibility; Min-price equilibrium; commons; indivisible goods

摘要

There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location, and thereby cause a congestion effect that is modeled in a general way. We assign harvesting rights based on preferences alone, though we later extend the model to accommodate private endowments of money. We find the best allocation rule in the class of rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, and that satisfy a weak continuity property. For a special class of preferences, we also find an ascending mechanism, similar to an auction, that implements the rule. The rule coincides with a special pseudo-market equilibrium, wherein agents buy their desired resource with tokens distributed by the social planner. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.