Lying and reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dato, Simon; Feess, Eberhard; Nieken, Petra
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Victoria University Wellington; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.014
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 193-218
• 关键词: private information; Lying; RECIPROCITY

摘要

We extend the literature on the determinants of lying to the impact of reciprocity in strategic interactions. We study a theoretical model with reciprocity by assuming that a player's degree of altruism depends on her perception of the other player's altruism towards herself. Specifically, we consider a sequential two-player-contest and vary the second mover's degree of information on the first movers lying behavior. This yields predictions on the second mover's behavior which we study in a largescale online-experiment and the laboratory. Surprisingly, the second mover's lying propensity does not depend on her information on the first mover's lying behavior. To investigate whether this is specific to lying, we consider an additional treatment with the same payoff structure where subjects can increase their chances of winning by simple statements without lying. As we do find evidence for reciprocity there, the lack of reciprocity cannot solely be attributed to the contest structure. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.