Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sawa, Ryoji
• 署名单位: University of Tsukuba
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 633-650
• 关键词: stochastic stability; Coalitional bargaining; coalition; Logit-response dynamics; bargaining

摘要

This study examines a dynamic process of n-person coalitional bargaining problems. We investigate the evolution of social conventions by embedding a coalitional bargaining setting in a dynamic process. In each period, a group of players may make some coalitional move, that is, forming a new team or negotiating the division of a surplus. Players revise their coalitions and surplus divisions over time in the presence of stochastic noise, which leads players to make a suboptimal decision. Under a logit specification of choice probabilities, we find that the stability of a core allocation decreases in the wealth of the richest player. Furthermore, stochastically stable allocations are core allocations that minimize the wealth of the richest player. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.