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作者：Moldovanu, Benny; Rosar, Frank
作者单位：University of Bonn; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：A large polarized electorate decides repeatedly between a reversible alternative (REMAIN) and an irreversible alternative (LEAVE) in an environment where the aggregate short-term effects of the decision vary from period to period. Decisions by simple majority or by a too low supermajority may perform poorly under circumstances where it is socially optimal to never LEAVE, as they can exhibit equilibria where LEAVE is chosen quickly. In general, a too low supermajority rule can have much higher ...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Yeh, Edmund; Zhang, Jinkun
作者单位：Yale University; Northeastern University
摘要：We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. We consider a multi-product environment where each buyer has preferences over a d-dimensional variety of goods. The seller is limited to offering a finite number n of d-dimensional choices. The limited menu reflects a finite communication capacity between the buyer and seller. We identify necessary conditions that the optimal finite menu must satisfy, for either the socially efficient or the revenue-maximizing mechanism. These conditions re...
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作者：Fehrler, Sebastian; Schneider, Maik T.
作者单位：University of Bremen; University of Bath
摘要：Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative-lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional trea...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Rey-Bellet, Luc
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the marginal bandwagon property (i.e., there is positive feedback to coordinate). Our main result is that the most likely evolutionary escape paths from a status quo convention consist of a series of identical mistakes. As an application of our result, we show that ...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Singh, Juni
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies a multi-state binary choice experiment in which in each state, one alternative has well understood consequences whereas the other alternative has unknown consequences. Subjects repeatedly receive feedback from past choices about the consequences of unfamiliar alternatives but this feedback is aggregated over states. Varying the payoffs attached to the various alternatives in various states allows us to test whether unfamiliar alternatives are discounted and whether subjects'...
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作者：Georgalos, Konstantinos
作者单位：Lancaster University
摘要：Neoclassical economic theory assumes that whenever agents tackle dynamic decisions under ambiguity, preferences are represented by the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model and prior beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule, upon the arrival of partial information. Nevertheless, when one considers non-neutral ambiguity attitudes, either the axiom of dynamic consistency or of consequentialism should be relaxed. Using data from an economic experiment on dynamic choice under ambiguity, we st...
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作者：Alexander, Dan
摘要：This paper presents a model of elections that explores the relationship between incumbent upsets and incumbents running unopposed. A valence-disadvantaged candidate (a potential challenger), who possesses private information about the extent of this disadvantage, first decides whether to challenge a valence-advantaged candidate (the incumbent). If the election is contested, the two candidates engage in policy competition. In equilibrium, the incumbent is never certain of the strength of a chal...
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作者：Frongillo, Rafael M.; Kash, Ian A.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding characterizations for all of these settings. This includes a new characterization of scoring rules for non-convex sets of distributions. We combine the characterization theorem with duality to give a simple construction to convert between scoring rules and randomized ...
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作者：Koch, Simon; Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：University of Kaiserslautern
摘要：The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are also effective with socially attentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain the puzzle why empirically only a fraction of employees experiences monetary incentives. Furthermore, in case the agent's type is private information, the principal optimally offers a single pooling cont...
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作者：Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Durham University; Deakin University; Boston College
摘要：Economists have long recognized that the effect of move order on outcomes is non-negligible in sequential contests. We study tiebreak mechanisms used in team sports and known as penalty shootouts through a dynamic model. We characterize all order-independent mechanisms where two balanced teams have equal chances to win the shootout whenever they are tied after equal numbers of attempts; thus, move order has no relevance for winning chances. In most sports, such as football and hockey, teams ta...
