Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Briscese, Guglielmo; Feltovich, Nick; Slonim, Robert L.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of Sydney; Monash University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 288-304
• 关键词: gift exchange; RECIPROCITY; Corporate philanthropy; self-selection

摘要

Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We also show that firms substitute donations to charity with lower wage offers, keeping their profits constant but reducing workers' earnings. Initiatives of corporate philanthropy can thus be marginally beneficial for firms, but considerably costly for workers. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.