Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu
• 署名单位: University of Turku; University of Glasgow; University of Naples Federico II; University of Helsinki
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 202-212
• 关键词: Implementation; Rights structures; Largest consistent set; core; (Maskin) monotonicity

摘要

The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This finding implies that the class of implementable solutions in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.