Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheikbossian, Guillaume
• 署名单位: INRAE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 206-226
• 关键词: Indirect evolutionary approach; evolutionary stability; altruism; Group contest; public goods

摘要

We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.