Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hedegaard, Morten; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Mueller, Daniel; Tyran, Jean-Robert
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; University of Innsbruck; University of Munich; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 231-255
• 关键词: Distributional preferences; social preferences; Equality-Equivalence Test; Representative online experiment; Trust game; Public goods game; dictator game

摘要

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a trust game and a public good game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game and contribute more to the public good than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.