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作者：Li, Xiangliang
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：We propose two solutions to Nash (1950)'s bargaining problem: the Consensus and Compromise solutions. They gradually diverge from the Nash solution. Regarding axioms, we decompose the Nash solution's Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) into distinct parts. The controversial ones are identified and successively replaced, leading to the Consensus and Compromise solutions. The two replacement parts are: 1). If the additional room for cooperation, resulting from deteriorating non-c...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Shabayek, Shaden
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies optimal targeting when the planner knows the architecture of the network but not the identities of agents occupying different positions in the network. We show that the planner's ability to discriminate among agents depends on the balance between in-and out-neighborhoods in the social network. When influence is reciprocal, the knowledge of the network architecture is sufficient for the planner to implement the first-best actions. When in-and out-neighborhoods are imbalanced,...
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作者：Tamura, Yuki
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：For object reallocation problems, TTC is the leading rule: if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowments lower bounds, and strategy-proofness (Ma, 1994); moreover, it is the only rule satisfying the endowments lower bounds, strategy-proofness, and endowment-swapping-proofness (Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2018). We focus on the domain of single-dipped preferences, and ask whether these results hold there. We show that they do. Returni...
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作者：Masiliunas, Aidas
作者单位：University of Sheffield
摘要：We test whether deviations from Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking contests can be explained by the slow convergence of payoff-based learning. We identify and eliminate two noise sources that slow down learning: first, opponents are changing their actions across rounds; second, payoffs are probabilistic, which reduces the correlation between expected and realized payoffs. We find that average choices are not significantly different from the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium predictions only when bot...
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作者：Carroni, Elias; Mantovani, Andrea; Minniti, Antonio
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：This paper examines the signaling role of prices in a context of salient thinking. Consumers cannot observe product quality directly, and they focus on the product attribute - either quality or price - that stands out in the market. Our analysis shows that salience considerations mitigate the incentive to signal quality via price. Moreover, depending on the difference in quality between products, the separating price of the high-quality seller can be inflated or deflated in relation to a set-u...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Duke University
摘要：We develop a prior-free mechanism for an asset market that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and asymptotically optimal- as the number of agents grows large, the designer's profit from using this mechanism approaches the profit it would optimally make if it knew the agents' type distribution at the outset. The direct implementation first identifies the agent whose value equals the Walrasian price. The second step can be described a...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Mago, Shakun
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Richmond; University of Virginia
摘要：We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and t...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We study an environment where an informed sender has conflicting interests with an uninformed receiver only in some states. Using an infection-like argument, we show that with symmetric loss functions, the presence of such disagreement states -even if they are very rare -leads to coarse communication in all states, even those where, following communication, it is commonly known that the players' interests are perfectly aligned. However, with asymmetric loss functions, one can construct example...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad
作者单位：Open University Israel
摘要：We prove that if each generation cares, non-paternalistically, about other generations' wellbeing rather than about their choices, and do not curb or otherwise alter future generations' choice sets, then backward induction intergenerational choice paths are efficient. This somewhat surprising result implies that intergenerational inefficiencies, to the extent that they do occur, are not due to different generations having different preferences, and prior generations trying to tip the scales in...
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作者：Skoda, Alexandre; Venel, Xavier
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We generalize the notion of convexity and average-convexity to the notion of weighted average-convexity. We show several results on the relation between weighted average-convexity and cooperative games. Our main result is that if a game is weighted average-convex, then the corresponding weighted Shapley value is in the core.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
