Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eliaz, Kfir; Frug, Alexander
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.010
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 718-729
• 关键词: Cheap talk; contagion

摘要

We study an environment where an informed sender has conflicting interests with an uninformed receiver only in some states. Using an infection-like argument, we show that with symmetric loss functions, the presence of such disagreement states -even if they are very rare -leads to coarse communication in all states, even those where, following communication, it is commonly known that the players' interests are perfectly aligned. However, with asymmetric loss functions, one can construct examples with truthful communication in some set of states.