-
作者：Yousefimanesh, Niloofar; Bos, Iwan; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper examines Stackelberg price-quantity competition with imperfectly substitutable products. Under general cost and demand conditions, we establish existence of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and provide a full characterization of the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. In each equilibrium, the leader rations part of its clientele. Assuming linear demand and cost functions, first-and second-mover advantages are shown to critically depend on the degree of spillover demand, i.e., ...
-
作者：Feess, Eberhard; Kerzenmacher, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington; University of Innsbruck; University of Hamburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We conduct a theory-guided experiment where subjects are matched in groups of three and vote on a morally questionable decision. We find that the frequency of votes for this decision increases with the number of votes required for it (threshold effect). This effect persists even when only considering pivotal voters, who cannot rely on sufficiently many votes for the decision by other group members (thereby reaping a benefit without own moral costs). Our design allows us to attribute the thresh...
-
作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：The generalized multiple-prize nested lottery contest framework has been broadly applied to model noisy competitions that award prizes to multiple recipients. Equilibrium existence was not formally established until the recent contribution of Fu et al. (2022). This paper comprehensively examines the equilibrium uniqueness of this contest model. We first consider a multi-prize contest with identical players, a scenario that is commonly assumed in the literature. We verify that a symmetric equil...
-
作者：Sawa, Ryoji; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Oregon
摘要：We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic converges to a Bayesian sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI) and the set of Bayesian SESIs is globally asymptotically stable. We discuss the global convergence to a unique Bayesian SESI in anti-coordination games, a welfare-improving tax scheme, equilibrium selection in coordination games, an application to t...
-
作者：Della Lena, Sebastiano; Manzoni, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio
作者单位：Monash University; University of Bergamo; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of gu...
-
作者：Meyer, Jacob; Rentschler, Lucas
作者单位：Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：We develop and experimentally test a model of voter information acquisition in nonpartisan elections, both with and without abstention. We theoretically demonstrate that allowing for abstention can increase information acquisition, provided the cost of information is not too low. Our experimental data find that voters are less responsive than predicted to increases in the cost of information. As a result, the cost required to yield higher levels of informedness when abstention is allowed is hi...
-
作者：Vohra, Akhil
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：I develop a model of majority-rule collective bargaining between a sports league and its players when delay costs incurred by players are wealth-dependent. I propose a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium that requires equilibrium strategies to be immune to deviations by any majority subgroup. I show this is equivalent to giving the player with median bargaining power the unilateral ability to negotiate with the league. Using this model, I demonstrate that policies reallocating surplus fr...
-
作者：Geng, Sen; Guan, Menglong
作者单位：Xiamen University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We explore theoretically and experimentally whether information design can be used by trustees as a signaling device to boost trusting acts. In our main setting, a trustee partially or fully decides a binary payoff allocation and designs an information structure, then a trustor decides whether to invest. In the control setting, information design is not available. In line with the standard equilibrium analysis, we find that introducing information design increases trustworthiness and trusting ...
-
作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Brown University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：In de Clippel et al. (2019), it is shown that, perhaps surprisingly, the set of implementable social choice functions is essentially the same whether agents have bounded depth of reasoning or rational expectations. The picture is quite different when taking into account the possibility of small modeling mistakes. While continuous (strict) equilibrium implementation becomes very demanding (Oury and Tercieux (2012) - OT), continuity in level-k implementation obtains essentially for free. A decom...
-
作者：Deligkas, Argyrios; Filos-Ratsikas, Aris; Voudouris, Alexandros A.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Edinburgh; University of Essex
摘要：We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0, 1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive ...
