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作者：Ahrens, Steffen; Bitter, Lea; Bosch-Rosa, Ciril
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; European Central Bank; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts-prepayments that can be clawed back later-have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. To do so, we investigate the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Contrary to most results in the loss contract literature, in our setup loss contracts ...
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作者：Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Barcelona
摘要：We examine the effect of the interim release of turnout information on elections in a model of a large electorate with a common voting cost, private values, and two alternatives. We consider that (i) one group of citizens votes before the rest and that (ii) the individuals of the second group know the first group's turnout-but not the vote tally-before they vote. The alternative with more votes in total is implemented. Our main result is that there is an equilibrium in which the ex-ante probab...
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作者：Cappelen, Alexander W.; Kariv, Shachar; Sorensen, Erik o.; Tungodden, Bertil
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We test the touchstones of economic rationality-utility maximization, stochastic dominance, and expected-utility maximization-of elite students in the U.S. and in Africa. The choices of most students in both samples are generally rationalizable, but the U.S. students' scores are substantially higher. Nevertheless, the development gap in economic rationality in incentivized risk choices between these future elites is much smaller than the difference in performance on a non-incentivized canonica...
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作者：Pahl, Lucas
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We develop index and degree theories for extensive form games allowing the identification of equilibria that are robust to payoff perturbations directly from the extensive form. Our approach is based on index and degree theories for games where the strategy sets are polytopes (and not necessarily simplices) and payoff functions are multiaffine. Polytope strategy sets arise naturally from topologically identifying equivalent mixed strategies of a normal form game.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All ...
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作者：Wang, Xinghua; Navarro-Martinez, Daniel
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：An increasing number of studies call into question the external validity of social preference games. In this paper, we show that these games have a low correlation with single pro-social behaviors in the field, but this correlation can be substantially increased by aggregating behaviors to reduce measurement error. We tracked people's daily pro-social behaviors for 14 days using a day reconstruction method; the same people played three different social preference games on seven different occas...
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作者：Li, Xueheng
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University
摘要：Strategic complementarities influence various social and economic activities. This study introduces a model to design a weighted and directed complementarity network to achieve a planner's objectives. The network represents the direction and intensity of complementarities between agents, influencing their best-responses to one another and determining equilibrium efforts. The planner's objective function can be convex, as commonly assumed in prior research, or arbitrarily concave to represent s...
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作者：Hagen, Martin
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad
摘要：A principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy -proof and robust to collusion, both when the agents can exchange money and physical units (reallocation-proofness) and when they cannot (group strategy-proofness). To achieve reallocation-proofness, the principal must offer the agents a fix...
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作者：Choudhury, Kangkan Dev; Aydinyan, Tigran
作者单位：University of Duisburg Essen
摘要：We study the dynamics of strategic choice in an environment where payoffs are perturbed by strategy-specific noise and strategy revision is governed by the simple proportional imitation protocol. Applying the stochastic replicator dynamic to a two-by-two symmetric game, we derive the steady-state frequencies of the strategies and show that the dominated strategy can persist in equilibrium if the variance of the payoff shocks exceeds a critical value. Additionally, the rate of decay of the domi...
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作者：Jain, Ritesh; Lombardi, Michele; Muller, Christoph
作者单位：University of Liverpool; University of Naples Federico II; University of Queensland
摘要：We introduce an equivalent definition for robust implementation, termed s-rationalizable implementation. We show that s-rationalizable implementation implies rationalizable implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011) and is implied by wr-implementation by static mechanisms (Muller, 2020). (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren; Jiang, Michelle
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University
摘要：Under majoritarian election systems, securing the participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is the adoption of Cumulative Voting (CV) in multi-member districts: each voter has as many votes as open positions but can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Historical experiences are promising but also reflect episodes of minority activism. We present the results...
