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作者：Bartling, Bjorn; Ozdemir, Yagiz
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor might step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. In a series of experiments, we study whether people invoke the replacement excuse, that is, the argument if I don't do it, someone else will, to justify narrowly self-interested actions. Our data are consistent with the possibility that the exi...
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作者：Wasser, Cedric; Zhang, Mengxi
作者单位：University of Basel; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valua-tions for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, our results for the winner's effort also imply that di...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Non-dictatorial preference domains allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. On a class of preference domains called unidimensional domains, we show that the unique seconds property (introduced by Aswal et al., 2003) characterizes all non-dictatorial domains. Subsequently, we provide an exhaustive classification of all non-dictatorial, unidimensional domains, based on a simple property of two-voter rules called invari...
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作者：Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Komornik, Vilmos
作者单位：Maastricht University; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy -free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time ...
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作者：Panova, Elena
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a fixed tree-network among users with differentiated willingness to pay for the good supplied through the network. We find that the associated value-sharing problem is convex, hence, the core is large and we axiomatize a new, computationally simple core selection based on the idea of proportionality.
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作者：Ma, Siyu; Biran, Dov
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; China University of Political Science & Law
摘要：This note stems from Jelnov et al. (2017), which analyzed the interaction of two enemy nations- Player 1 (the weak nation) and Player 2 (the strong nation). 1 (he) wishes to develop a nuclear bomb, and 2 (she) who employs a noisy intelligence system, IS, aims to deter him. Based on the signal sent by IS, 2 decides whether to attack 1. If the precision (a) of IS is commonly known, not only 2 is strictly better off with a better quality (higher precision) IS but also is 1. In contrast, this note...
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作者：Altuntas, Acelya; Phan, William; Tamura, Yuki
作者单位：Deakin University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Consider object exchange problems when each agent may be endowed with and consume more than one object. For most domains of preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. Insisting on the first two properties, we explore the extent to which weaker incentive compatibility can be achieved. Motivated by behavioral and computational considerations as well as online mechanisms, we define several forms of manipulation. We consider the lexicographic doma...
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作者：Li, Anqi; Hu, Lin
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Australian National University
摘要：We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signals exhibit an own-party bias, which hampers their ability to discern the good and bad performances of the incumbent. While this effect alone would undermine electoral accountability and selection, there is a countervailing effect stemming from partisan disagreement, which makes ...
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作者：Mattsson, Lars-Goran; Weibull, Jorgen W.
作者单位：Royal Institute of Technology; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse or risk neutral. The agent is free to choose any probability distribution over outcomes, where some distributions require more effort than others. The agent's effort-cost function is of Legendre type and satisfies an axiom of invariance under mergers of outcomes that are equally paid by the principal. We analyze a family of such effort-cost functions. For a canonical subclass...
