Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tamura, Yuki
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 181-196
• 关键词: Object reallocation problems; Single -dipped preferences; TTC; Obvious strategy-proofness

摘要

For object reallocation problems, TTC is the leading rule: if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowments lower bounds, and strategy-proofness (Ma, 1994); moreover, it is the only rule satisfying the endowments lower bounds, strategy-proofness, and endowment-swapping-proofness (Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2018). We focus on the domain of single-dipped preferences, and ask whether these results hold there. We show that they do. Returning to preferences that are strict but otherwise unrestricted, TTC is not obviously strategy-proof (Li, 2017). Again we ask if this remains true on the domain of single-dipped preferences, and show that on this domain, TTC does satisfy this property. Moreover, the domain of single-dipped preferences is a maximal domain on which TTC is obviously strategy-proof. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.