The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kloosterman, Andrew; Mago, Shakun
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of Richmond; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 812-832
• 关键词: Volunteer's dilemma; repeated games; COORDINATION

摘要

We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is random. We find that turn-taking is the dominant play when costs are symmetric. When costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, asymmetric randomly allocated costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking. When costs are asymmetric and constant over time, behavior is markedly heterogeneous.