Reallocation with priorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Combe, Julien; Schlegel, Jan Christoph
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.015
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 287-299
• 关键词: Matching; Housing market; reallocation; STABILITY; priorities

摘要

We consider a reallocation problem with priorities where each agent is initially endowed with a house and is willing to exchange it but each house has a priority ordering over the agents of the market. In this setting, it is well known that there is no individually rational and stable mechanism. As a result, the literature has introduced a modified stability notion called n0 stability. In contrast to college admission problems, in which priorities are present but there is no initial endowment, we show that the ownership-adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism identified in the literature is not the only individually rational, strategy-proof and n0-stable mechanism. By introducing a new axiom called the independence of irrelevant agents and using the standard axiom of unanimity, we show that the ownership-adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, n0-stable, unanimous and independent of irrelevant agents.