Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durand, Francois; Mace, Antonin; Nunez, Matias
• 署名单位: Nokia Corporation; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-34
• 关键词: Approval voting; Poisson games; strategic voting; Condorcet consistency; Fictitious play; Expressive voting

摘要

We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three -candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti -Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political t & acirc;tonnement which delivers rich insights. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to several alternative welfare criteria and the introduction of expressive voters.