Efficient public good provision between and within groups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; Foucart, Renaud; Sengupta, Sonali
• 署名单位: University of Winchester; BPP University; Lancaster University; Queens University Belfast
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 183-190
• 关键词: Public goods; groups; position uncertainty; Voluntary contributions

摘要

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monz & oacute;n (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.