Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barokas, Guy; Nitzan, Shmuel
• 署名单位: Ruppin Academic Center; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.008
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 175-180
• 关键词: Borda rule; Arrow's independence condition; Social choice theory; Robustness property

摘要

In his refined characterization of the Borda rule, Maskin (2025; forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy) significantly employs the assumption of a continuum of voters. He concludes by posing an important open question about the possible extension of the characterization result to the case of finitely many voters. This note provides a positive response to this question, based on a novel axiom that conveys the normative appeal of continuity when applied to a discrete setting, namely, that the social rule is not overly sensitive to a small change in voters' preferences.