Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Damme, Eric; Lang, Xu
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Shandong University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 387-400
• 关键词: Bargaining problem; incomplete information; Axiomatic method; EFFICIENCY; DISAGREEMENT

摘要

We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, a similar independence result holds for ex post efficient mechanisms that are individually rational, provided the players' budgets satisfy a certain condition. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory, surplus extraction by an informed principal and egalitarian mechanisms.