SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN LARGE NETWORKS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xu, Haiqing
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12269
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 257-284
• 关键词: college attendance; large numbers; MODEL; identification; regression; BEHAVIOR; choices; LAWS

摘要

This article studies estimation of social interactions in a large network game, where all observations come from one single equilibrium of a network game with asymmetric information. Simple assumptions about the structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence condition requiring that dependence between two players' decisions decay with their network distance, which serves as the basis for my statistical inference. Moreover, I establish identification and propose a computationally feasible and efficient estimation method, which is illustrated by an empirical application of college attendance.