DO LIES ERODE TRUST?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gawn, Glynis; Innes, Robert
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Merced
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12265
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 137-161
• 关键词: indirect reciprocity; social preferences; false consensus; lying aversion; game; truth; deception; fairness; experiences; promises

摘要

Does honesty promote trust and trustworthiness? We investigate how being lied to (versus told the truth) in a Gneezy deception game affects behavior in a subsequent trust game with different players. Using a design that controls for potential treatment effects on payoffs, mood, and beliefs about the overall propensity for honesty in the experiment, we find that the specific experience of being lied to significantly erodes trust and trustworthiness.