UNIVERSALISM AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL POWER

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koh, Yumi
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12307
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1375-1402
• 关键词: distributive politics; pork barrel; buying supermajorities; bargaining model; legislatures; ECONOMY; demand; preferences; PARTIES; SYSTEM

摘要

Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed-upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the Bridge Bill Capital Budget in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.