Coalitional power structure in stochastic social choice functions with an unrestricted preference domain
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Nandeibam, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0011
发表日期：
1996
页码：
212-233
关键词：
摘要：
When the individuals in P. K. Pattanaik and B. Peleg [Econometrica 54 (1986), 909-921] are permitted to have weak preference orders, we show that: (i) as in their paper, there is a unique weight for each coalition; and (ii) for each feasible proper subset of the universal set and each preference profile, the society can be partitioned, so that the weight of each coalition in this partition gives the probability of choosing some alternative which is best in the feasible set for at least one individual in the coalition. When the universal set is the Feasible set, our result still holds provided certain additional conditions are satisfied. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.