Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cressman, R
署名单位：
University of Guelph
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0012
发表日期：
1996
页码：
234-248
关键词：
摘要：
The dynamic evolutionary stability of mutual defection is proven for the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where payoffs are cumulative and the number of repetitions is known. This agrees with the classical result that the only Nash equilibrium outcome is to defect al all stages of this repeated game. Moreover, it is shown that, for any initial polymorphic population, the evolutionary dynamic converges to a unique Nash equilibrium strategy that depends on the original polymorphism. Both these results confirm earlier conjectures concerning the application of evolutionary game theory to the repeated prisoner's dilemma. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.